

OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

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Origin

SS

Info

ACTION: USUN, NEW YORK

PRIORITY 1135

EYES ONLY

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FOR STEVENSON AND McCLOY

SUBJECT: Next Steps in New York Negotiations

I. BASIC ASSUMPTIONS

unfulfilled

1. The loose ends still remaining ~~unfulfilled~~ in original ~~understanding~~ understanding between President and Khrushchev are these:

On Soviet side, on-site UN-supervised verification of removal of offensive weapons, and longer-term safeguards against their reintroduction. On our side, formal assurances against invasion of Cuba.

2. Recent indications from Soviets make clear their intention: to disengage militarily from Cuba, but to stick to ~~their~~ ^{Castro} their story that they have saved the ~~Soviet~~ regime from US invasion. Our interest lies in speeding the disengagement process, while avoiding the kind of commitment that unduly ties our hands in dealing with the Castro regime while it lasts.

3. On verification and safeguards,

(a) The Soviets have given no indication that they are prepared to press Castro regime as hard as would be necessary to get Cubans to agree to any acceptable inspection system;

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The Under Secretary

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(b) Cubans have consistently been adamant in objecting to ground inspection of any kind, and have rejected several progressively softer proposals by SYG on verification;

(c) Both Soviets and Cubans have stressed need for reciprocal arrangements involving inspection of other Caribbean areas, probably including US, as ^{price} ~~prize~~ for inspection of Cuba.

4. Therefore it is not going to be possible in the short run to get a UN system of short-term verification or long-term safeguards on offensive weapons in the Caribbean.

5. Assuming (which is not wholly clear) that it would be possible to develop a satisfactory arrangement for adequate long-term safeguards on basis of actuality in the Caribbean area, it is not (repeat not) to our interest to have the Soviets involved in creating, negotiating, or administering such safeguards.

6. Absence of inspection arrangements, while leaving part of original deal unfulfilled, does provide rationale for (a) continued US photographic reconnaissance over Cuba, operating under existing OAS resolution, and (b) the tough conditions on our non-invasion assurances.

II. LONG STALL vs RAPID WRAP-UP

1. On this analysis, that we will not be able to get satisfactory arrangements for ground and air inspection, we have two alternatives:

(a) to continue negotiations as long as initial offer period, looking on Soviet position with our full position that there should be UN verification of their withdrawal of offensive weapons

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as well as QTE suitable safeguards UNQTE against their reintroduction into Cuba;

(b) to close out this phase of the negotiations if immediately on the basis of the steps the Soviet Union has taken and will promise to take, adapting our undertakings to reflect the absence so far of meaningful UN inspection arrangements.

2. There are distinct advantages to closing out this phase of the negotiations with the Soviets without delay. The Soviets would have the opportunity to disengage themselves from major military involvement in Cuba. We would be enabled to deal with Cuba largely as a Hemispheric problem and to consider next steps on long-range safeguards in a Caribbean Latin American context, without the intrusion of the Soviet Union. This would permit us to seek progress with the Soviet Union on wider subjects, such as nuclear testing, Berlin, disarmament and the election of the Secretary General.

III. TOWARD A SECURITY COUNCIL MEETING

1. To accomplish a speedy wrap-up of current phase of negotiations, Soviets evidently have in mind a Security Council meeting at which agreed declarations would be made by the US and the USSR, a report would be made by SYG, and an agreed summation would be made by Chairman or in simple procedural resolution adopted by the Council. Soviets are not insisting on a formal protocol, nor do they seem to be insisting that Cubans be parties to this accord at this stage.

2. The United States is quite prepared to work toward such

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a wrap-up meeting of Security Council. In view of the non-fulfillment of important aspects of the original understanding, we cannot and should not declare the understanding fulfilled. However, we can adopt a procedure which enables a GTE line to be drawn under UNCTE the US-Soviet crisis over Cuba, while leaving open questions that must be sorted out with Cuba in hemispheric context over long span of time.

3. In the course of negotiations during this next phase, we would have to make clear, both to officials and to general public, that the original understanding was never properly fulfilled, and the absence of on-site verification and of longer-term safeguards against subterfuge makes it necessary for us to retain full freedom of action as regards aerial surveillance and other means of keeping a close eye on Cuba for any evidence of renewed Soviet intrusion into Hemisphere. We would continue to remind world that declaration of intention must be independently checked in a world still so full of international distrust, which has just been treated to a classic example of large-scale duplicity. However, until after 30 meeting we would avoid making our intentions on continued air surveillance manifest in a form or form that would beg the Soviets to raise issue of violation of Cuban air space.

circumstances

In the interim, we will have to place conditions on our continued air surveillance. We will have to be as clear as possible with the United Nations and with the public, and with the Soviets, to indicate the limits to our protest. We will have to make clear our regional arrangements for longer-term safeguards if Cubans cooperate, and for a limited period of time if they do not, and military response to any Cuban aggression, as they do not.

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SCENARIO IN THE SECURITY COUNCIL

Within this framework we would favor a Security Council meeting during next week at which the following steps would be taken:

1. The Secretary-General would report on the steps he has taken; and in particular his series of unsuccessful efforts to secure Cuban agreement to UN on-site inspection to verify withdrawal and dismantling of offensive weapons and to safeguard against future reintroduction.

2. The Soviet Union would make a declaration indicating steps it has taken pursuant to the US-USSR understanding and containing assurances that all missiles and nuclear components have been removed, that the IL-28's would come out within four weeks, that military units and personnel intended for the protection of these weapons systems will be removed in time, and that no offensive weapons would be reintroduced in Cuba in the future.

3. The United States would make a parallel declaration:
(Being sent USUM in SEPTEL)

- (a) taking note of the Soviet assurances cited above;
- (b) indicating that we have lifted the quarantine;
- (c) stating our non-invasion assurances, contingent on Cuban behavior.

4. These declarations would be noted by the Security Council President in a "summation" which would have to be agreed ahead

of time

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Alternatively
of time. ~~Alternatively~~ a brief procedural resolution noting the
declaration might be less difficult to achieve ^{than} ~~than~~ getting UAR
to agree to an acceptable summation. If a resolution is used,
it should contain no substantive elements and should establish no
~~SAKINZNYI~~ continuing machinery.

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